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Abstract
Availability quantification and prediction of IT infrastructure in data centers are of para-
mount importance for online business enterprises. In this chapter, we present comprehen-
sive availability models for practical case studies in order to demonstrate a state-space
stochastic reward net model for typical data center systems for quantitative assessment of
system availability. We present stochastic reward net models of a virtualized server sys-
tem, a data center network based on DCell topology, and a conceptual data center for
disaster tolerance. The systems are then evaluated against various metrics of interest,
including steady state availability, downtime and downtime cost, and sensitivity analysis.
Keywords: virtualized servers system, data center system, disaster tolerant data center
1. Introduction
Data centers (DCs) have been the core-centric of modern ICT ecosystems in recent decades.
Computing resources and crucial telecommunications are centralized in a data center to
constantly facilitate online business and to connect people from distant parts of the world
through the internet. Giant internet companies such as Facebook, Amazon, and Google have
built huge state-of-the-art centers to house their own IT infrastructure. According to a study by
the Ponemon Institute [1] regarding the cost of data center outages from 63 DCs located in the
United States over a 12-month period, the average cost due to unplanned outages in 2016 was
US$ 740,357, which steadily increased by 46% from US$ 505,502 since it was first studied in
2010. Specifically, a minute of downtime costs around US$ 7900 on average. However, online
businesses actually face more severe revenue losses due to IT service downtime. In early 2016,
Amazon suffered an incredible business loss of US$ 66,240/minute due to server downtime
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over a period of approximately 15 minutes. The causes of system outages in DCs span from
uncertain failures of IT parts/blocks to natural disasters. Therefore, a quantification of IT
infrastructure availability in DCs under various scenarios in advance of system development
is of paramount importance for big tech companies.
Availability assessment approaches are primarily based on measurement and modeling
methods. Model-based approaches are fast and relatively inexpensive methods for system
availability analysis in comparison with measurement-based methods. System modeling can
be accomplished using discrete-event simulation [2, 3], analytical models, or a hybrid of both
approaches. Analytical models fall into four main categories [4–7]: (i) non-state-space models
(reliability graph (RelGraph), reliability block diagram (RBG), or fault tree (FT)), state-space
models (Markov chains, Stochastic Petri net (SPN), stochastic reward net (SRN), etc.), hierar-
chical models, and fixed-point iterative models. Non-state-space modeling paradigms provide
a relatively quick evaluation of basic metrics for a system (reliability, availability, MTTF) with a
proper capture of overall system architecture. State-space models, on the other hand, can
capture sophisticated behaviors and operations of a system. This approach can handle failure/
repair dependencies and complex interactions between system components. To avoid the
largeness problem (or state-space explosion problem) in state-space models, we use hierarchi-
cal modeling techniques of non-state-space and state-space models at upper and lower levels,
as well as fix-point iterative models. In this chapter, we focus on studying complex system
operations in DCs captured by using an SRN.
The structure of this chapter is organized into six sections. Section 2 provides preliminary
concepts of availability modeling and analysis of data center systems (DCS). Subsequently,
several case studies are presented. Section 3 offers an availability model of a unit system of the
virtualized server (VSS) in DCs. In Section 4, we present availability modeling of a data center
network (DCN) based on DCell topology. We present an SRNmodel for a DC in order to study
disaster tolerance in Section 5. Finally, we present conclusions in Section 6.
2. Availability quantification of data center systems: basic concepts
Availability A(t) of a DCS represents the probability of its operating system taking the correct
state at an instant t, regardless of the number of failures and repairs during the interval (0,t).
Instantaneous/point availability A(t) is related to the system reliability, as defined in Eq. (1).
A tð Þ ¼ R tð Þ þ
ðt
0
R t xð Þg xð Þdx (1)
R(t) is the instantaneous reliability at t of the system, which is defined in Eq. (2):
R tð Þ ¼
ð
∞
t
f xð Þdx (2)
f(x) is the probability density function of a random variable X, which represents the system’s
lifetime or time to failure.
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g(x) is a renewal process rate in the interval (0,t), as defined in Eq. (3)
g xð Þ ¼ f xð Þ þ
ðx
0
g x uð Þf uð Þdu (3)
m(x)dx is the probability that a renewal process cycle will be completed in the time interval [x,
x + dx]. R(t-x) is the probability that the systemworks properly for the remaining time interval t-x.
R(t-x)m(x)dx is the probability of the case that a fault has occurred and that after the repair/renewal
(which occurred at the instance x, 0 < x < t), the system resumed functioningwith no further faults.
If a system is not repairable, the concept of A(t) is identical with that of reliability R(t).
Steady-state availability (SSA) is the system availability after a long running time, where the
limiting value A(t) tends to decrease from 1 at the initial instant, as defined in Eq. (4) and Eq. (5).
A ¼ limA tð Þ
t!∞
¼
MTTF
MTTFþMTTR
(4)
A ¼ limA tð Þ
t!∞
¼
μ
λþ μ
(5)
The failure rate (λ) implies the frequency of system failure is determined by the total number of
failures within an item population, divided by the total time expended by that population,
during a particular measurement interval under the stated conditions. Repair rate (μ) implies
the frequency of system repair determined as the average number of repairs over a period of
maintenance time. Mean time to failure (MTTF) represents the expected time in which a system
functions correctly before its first failure. Mean time to repair (MTTR) represents the expected
time required for system repair. In the case where failure/repair events comply with exponen-
tial distributions, MTTF and MTTR represent an arithmetic inversion of failure and repair
rates, as shown in Eq. (6). SSA can be computed from Eq. (5).
MTTF ¼
1
λ
MTTR ¼
1
μ
(6)
In industry, system administrators are usually concerned with system downtime (measured in
minutes per year) and downtime cost (with a cost unit C per minute of system downtime). These
values can be computed with Eq. (7) and (8).
Downtime ¼ 1 Að Þ∗8760∗60 (7)
Downtime Cos t ¼ C∗ 1 Að Þ∗8760∗60 (8)
Sensitivity analysis is performed to assess the importance of system parameters by two tech-
niques. (i) Repeatedly substitute specific parameter values in one range at a time while
the others remain constant, and observe system behaviors in accordance with the variation of
the selected parameter. This approach studies the system responses upon a broad range of the
parameters under consideration. (ii) Differential sensitivity analysis: compute partial derivatives
of the measure of interest with respect to each system parameter as determined in Eq. (9) or
(10) to yield a scaled sensitivity.
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Sτ Að Þ ¼
∂A
∂τ
(9)
SSτ Að Þ ¼
∂A
∂τ
τ
A
 
(10)
Stochastic reward net (SRN) [8] has been an appropriate modeling paradigm to capture opera-
tional complexities in industrial hardware and software systems [9–14]. According to a specific
description of system operations, ones can model system behaviors using place(s), transition(s)
and arc(s) as three main components in an SRN model. To represent a certain entity of the
system to be considered, we use token(s) (normally denoted by a dot or an integer number to
represent a number of corresponding entities) which reside in each place of the SRN model.
And to capture its operational state variations, we use (input/output) arcs to connect transition(s)
to place(s) or place(s) to transition(s), respectively. A firing of a transition is triggered when a
certain condition of system state is matched in order to allow the token(s) in a place are
removed, and then deposited in another place. The transitions of tokens in an SRN model
captures the system’s operations while the residence of tokens in places represent the system’s
operational state at a time, which is call marking. The Boolean condition attached to each
transition which is to enable/disable the transition is called the guard. A set of guard functions
can be defined to articulate the behaviors of system state dependence and transition. A
marking-dependence (denoted by a # sign attached to a transition) is incorporated when the
transition’s rate is dependent on the marking of the SRN model at a time. Other features of
SRN including inhibitor arcs, multiplicities, and input arcs can simplify the construction of
SRN models.
SRN-based availability quantification framework is presented in Figure 1. The availability quanti-
fication framework consists of three stages: (i) requirement specification, (ii) SRN-based system
modeling and (iii) system analysis. Service level agreement (SLA) [15, 16] between system
owner and customer details system specification and requirements. In the stage (i), taking into
Figure 1. SRN-based availability quantification framework.
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account the literature review based on prior art and contemporary development of the system,
ones can define problem statements to be modeled and observed. In the stage (ii), the person in
charge of modeling and evaluating the system can refer various default values of system
parameters from previous work. He/she can propose the architecture design and detailed
behaviors taken into consideration of the system. The SRN is used to capture the pre-defined
system operations. The SRN system model is then analyzed and the system availability evalu-
ation is performed with regard to various output measures of interest via different analysis
approaches such as steady-state availability and/or sensitivity analysis.
3. Case study I: a virtualized server system
3.1. System architecture
Figure 2 shows a general VSS architecture. A VSS is a computing unit in a DC which consists
of a number of physical servers (also called hosts H1, H2, …, Hn). Each server is in turn
virtualized using bare-metal virtualization technology [17–19]. Thus, each server hosts its
own hypervisor (hereinafter, called the virtual machine monitor (VMM)). The physical server
is capable of running a number of virtual machines (VM) on top of its VMM. For the sake of
fault tolerance and data storage of VMMs and VMs, the physical servers are interconnected via
a network pipeline to each other, and to a shared storage area network (SAN).
To focus on modeling complex behaviors of a virtualized system in a detailed manner, we
consider a small-size VSS consisting of two hosts (H1 and H2) connected to a shared SAN.
Each host runs its own virtual machine monitors VMM1 and VMM2, respectively. Two VMs
are also created on each host, VM1 for host H1 and VM2 for host H2. In the next section, we
will present SRN models of the above-mentioned subsystems. The models capture in detail
various failure modes and recovery methods, including hardware failures in physical hosts
and SAN [20, 21], failures due to non-aging related Mandelbugs on both VMM and VM
subsystems [22], and software aging-related failures and corresponding time-interval software
rejuvenation techniques for VMM and VM subsystems [23, 24]. Furthermore, we incorporate
Figure 2. A virtualized server system with two physical servers.
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hierarchically complex dependencies between subsystems, including the dependences of a VM
on its VMM, a VM on the shared SAN, and a VMM on its host. Without loss of generality, the
proposed SRN model represents the sophisticated operations of, and interactions between
subsystems, in a typical virtualized system as a computing unit brick in a practical DC.
The model can be further extended in the future by incorporating a large scale cloud system
as in [25].
3.2. SRN models of VSS
The SRN system model is presented in Figure 3. We use a two-state SRN model to capture the
operational state (UP) and failed state (DOWN) of the physical parts, including host 1 (H1),
host 2 (H2), and SAN, as shown in Figure 3(a)–(c), respectively.
The VMM subsystem models are shown in Figure 3(d) and (f) for VMM1 and its clock,
respectively, and in Figure 3(e) and (g) for VMM2 and its clock, respectively. Without loss of
generality, a model of a VMM (either VMM1 or VMM2) subsystem consists of six states
(represented by shaded places): (i) normally running state (PVMMup), (ii) failure state due to
non-Mandelbugs (PVMMf), (iii) down-state due to a failure of its underlying host (PVMMdn), (iv)
failure-probable state due to aging problems (PVMMfp), (v) aging-failure state due to aging of
equipment (PVMMaf), and (vi) rejuvenation-process state (PVMMrej). Initially, there is a token in
PVMMup to represent a running VMM. If it fails due to a non-aging Mandelbug, the transition
time TVMMf is fired to transit the token into PVMMf. Recovery is captured by TVMMrepair. After
running for a long time, the VMM suffers a high failure probability while remaining opera-
tional. Therefore, it goes to the failure-probable state PVMMfp as TVMMfp is fired. Failure due to
aging occurs soon after TVMMaf is fired and the VMM goes to the aging-failure state PVMMaf. Its
recovery is represented by the firing of TVMMar. If the VMM’s underlying host goes down (i.e., a
token is deposited in PHf in respective Figure 3(a) or (b)) while the VMM is in the UP states
(normal PVMMup or failure-probable PVMMfp), the VMM immediately enters the down-state
PVMMdn through the immediate fired transitions tVMMupdn or tVMMfpdn. A reset is necessary for
the VMM to go up (captured by TVMMreset) after its host is recovered. In the meantime, the
VMM clock is initiated by a token in PVMMclock, which counts time by firing a timed transition
TVMMclockinterval that complies with the cVMM-stage Erlang distribution. Every software rejuve-
nation process interval on a VMM is represented by a firing of TVMMclockinterval, and the token in
PVMMclock is removed and deposited in PVMMpolicy. Thus, rejuvenation is triggered if there is a
VMM in PVMMup or PVMMfp by firing the immediate transitions tVMMuprej or tVMMrej. Also, the
token in PVMMpolicy of the VMM clock model is moved to PVMMtrigger. The VMM represented by
a token in PVMMrej is then rejuvenated and returned to the normal state PVMMup as TVMMrej is
fired. The VMM clock is reset as tVMMclockreset is fired to start a new interval of time-based
software rejuvenation on a VMM. The modeling of VMM1 on host H1 and VMM2 on host H2
are identical based on the general model description as above.
Modeling of VM subsystems is shown in Figure 3(h) and (j) for VM1 subsystem and its clock,
respectively, and Figure 3(i) and (k) for VM2 subsystem and its clock, respectively. The models
initiate with two tokens in PVMup representing two VMs on each host. In general, the SRN
model of a VM subsystem also consists of six states as in the VMM subsystem does including:
(i) normal state (PVMup), (ii) failure state due to non-aging Mandelbugs (PVMf), (iii) down-state
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due to a failure of underlying VMM (PVMdn), (iv) failure-probable state due to aging problems
(PVMfp), (v) aging-failure state due to a failure of aging (PVMaf) and (vi) rejuvenation-process
state (PVMrej). The operations of the VM subsystem in correspondence with the transitions of
Figure 3. SRN system model of a VSS: (a) Host 1, (b) Host 2, (c) SAN, (d) VMM1, (e) VMM2, (f) VMM1’s clock, (g)
VMM2’s clock, (h) VM1, (i) VM2, (j) VM1’s clock, and (k) VM2’s clock.
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tokens in the SRNmodel are similarly described as those of the VMM subsystem. However, the
SRNmodel of the VM subsystem is further extended by incorporating (i) marking-dependence
represented by a “#” mark nearby selected timed transitions (TVMfp, TVMf, TVMreset) to capture
the cases in which two VMs in the same state compete with each other in order to transit to a
new state and (ii) dependence between the VM subsystem and SAN. The second dependence is
captured by the immediate transitions tVMupo, tVMfo, tVMdno, tVMfpo, tVMafo, and tVMrejo in the VM
model, and tVMclocko, tVMpolicyo, and tVMtriggero in the VM clock model. As the SAN fails (depicted
by a token in PSANf), these transitions are fired to remove tokens in the VM model and VM
clock model, regardless of their locations representing the loss of VM images on SAN and VM
clock functionalities. Nevertheless, as soon as the SAN is recovered, two VMs are immediately
created on the SAN, and they are booted onto a VMM of a corresponding host. The creation of
multiple VMs is captured by tVMstop, whereas the booting of a VM in the sequence is captured
by TVMboot with marking-dependence. The VM clock is also started after the recovery of a SAN,
as captured by PVMclockstop and two immediate transitions tVMclockstop and tVMclockstart.
3.3. Availability analysis scenarios and results
We implemented the SRN models in the Stochastic Petri Net Package (SPNP) [26]. Input
parameters are selected based on previous work [20, 27], as shown in Table 1.
Input Description Transitions Value Input Description Transitions Value
μhr Host repair TH1r, TH2r 3 days λhf Host fail TH1f, TH2f 1 years
λvmmf VMM non-aging
failure
TVMM1f, TVMM2f 2654 hours λvmf VM non-aging
failure
TVM1f, TVM2f 2893 hours
μvmmr VMM reset TVMM1reset,
TVMM2reset
1 min δvmr VM repair TVM1repair,
TVM2repair
30 min
δvmmr VMM repair TVMM1repair,
TVMM2repair
100 min μvmr VM restart TVM1reset,
TVM2reset
50s
βvmmfp VMM failure-
probable
TVMM1fp, TVMM2fp 2 months βvmfp VM failure-probable TVM1fp, TVM2fp 1 month
λvmmaf VMM aging-
failure
TVMM1af, TVMM2af 2 weeks λvmaf VM aging failure TVM1af, TVM2af 1 week
μvmmar VMM aging
recovery
TVMM1ar,TVMM2ar 120 min μvmar VM aging recovery TVM1ar, TVM2ar 120 min
τvmm VMM clock
interval
TVMM1clockinterval,
TVMM1clockinterval
1 week τvm VM clock interval TVM1clockinterval,
TVM2clockinterval
3.5 days
βvmmrej VMM
rejuvenation
TVMM1rej, TVMM1rej 2 min βvmrej VM rejuvenation TVM1rej, TVM2rej 1 min
λsf
μsr
SAN fail
SAN repair
TSANf
TSANrepair
1 year
3 days
ηvmb VM booting after
VMM rejuvenation
TVM1boot,
TVM2boot
50s
cVMM cVMM-stage
Erlang
distribution
x 10 cVM cVM-stage Erlang
distribution
X 10
Table 1. Input parameters of SRN models.
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• Steady-state availability: We conducted numerical experiments in seven case studies with
regard to different rejuvenation combinations. The case studies are described along with
analysis results of SSA of VMM and SSA of VM in Table 2. The reward functions used to
compute SSAs are defined as
SSAVMM ¼
1 : if #PVMM1up þ #PVMM1fp þ #PVMM2up þ #PVMM2fp
 
> 0
0 : otherwise
8<
:
SSAVM ¼
1 : if #PVM1up þ #PVM1fp þ #PVM2up þ #PVM2fp
 
> 0
0 : otherwise
8<
:
(11)
where #PX is the number of token in place PX. The results show that the following:
i. Time-based rejuvenation techniques with default parameters, when implemented on
both VMM and VM subsystems in combination does not gain the highest SSA for the
virtualized system. When a VMM undergoes a rejuvenation process, it pulls down all
VMs running on top of the VMM;
ii. Rejuvenation on VMM exposes more effectiveness in gaining higher SSA in comparison
to the VM.
iii. An appropriate rejuvenation combination implemented on either a VMM or VM with
proper clock intervals can actually enhance system availability.
• Sensitivity analysis of SSA: The sensitivity analysis is observed in five case studies w.r.t the
variation of: (i) only VMM1 clock’s interval; (ii) only VM1 clock’s interval; (iii) both VMM1
and VMM2 clocks’ interval; (iv) both VM1 and VM2 clocks’ interval; and (v) all clock
intervals with the same duration, as shown in Figure 4. The findings are as follows:
Cases Description SSA of VMM SSA of VM
I Rejuvenation is applied on all VMM and VM subsystems in both hosts. 0.999912470996 0.991769547666
II Rejuvenation is not applied only on one of VMM subsystems in two hosts but
applied on both VM subsystems in two hosts.
0.999908948744 0.991766082049
III Rejuvenation is applied on both VMM subsystems in two hosts but not
applied to only one of two VM subsystems.
0.999912470996 0.991770317258
IV Rejuvenation is not applied on haft side of the system including VMM1 and
VM1 subsystems but applied on VMM2 and VM2 subsystems.
0.999908948744 0.991766912872
V Rejuvenation is not applied on both VMM subsystems in two hosts but
applied on both VM subsystems.
0.999905284754 0.991763344539
VI Rejuvenation is applied on both VMM subsystems in two hosts, but not
applied on both VM subsystems.
0.999912470996 0.991771080172
VII Rejuvenation is not applied on VMM and VM subsystems in both hosts. 0.999905284754 0.99176419998
Table 2. Analysis scenarios of VSS and SSAs of VMM and VM subsystems.
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i. Figure 4(a) and (b) shows that rejuvenation processes on VMM reduce SSA of the
VM, but those on VM can improve. A proper combination of rejuvenation processes
on the VMM and VM can yield an efficient impact for maintaining high values of
SSA of VM.
ii. Figure 4(c) and (d) shows that there is no dependence of a VMM on its VM incorpo-
rated in the modeling of the proposed VSS yet. Also, rejuvenation implemented on
both VMM subsystems of both hosts obviously gains higher SSA of VMM than it
would if implemented on only one of the VMM subsystems.
4. Case study II: a DCell-based data center network
4.1. A typical DCN architecture
In this section, the DCell in consideration is expanded in size up to a network of virtualized
servers complying a DCell topology. A DCell [28] is recursively constructed based on the most
basic element DCell0 as follows:
i. A DCell0 consists of n physical servers connected to an n-port switch.
Figure 4. Sensitivity analysis of SSA of VMM and VM subsystems: (a) SSA of VM with respect to VMM clocks’ intervals,
(b) SSA of VMwith respect to VM clocks’ intervals, (c) SSA of VMMwith respect to VMM clocks’ intervals, and (d) SSA of
VMM with respect to VM clocks’ intervals.
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ii. A DCell1 is composed of n + 1 DCell0s. Each server of a DCell0 in a DCell1 has two links.
One connects to its switch, the other connects to the corresponding server in another
DCell0, complying with a predetermined DCell routing algorithm. Consequently, every
pair of DCell0s in a DCell1 has an exact unique link between each other.
iii. A DCellk is a level-k of DCellk-1.
To apply the proposed modeling approach using SRN, we focus on studying a special case of
DCell-based DCN at level 1 (DCell1). Particularly, a cell DCell0 consists of two physical servers
and one shared switch. DCell1 is composed of three DCell0s, as shown in Figure 5. We assume
that each server has two NICs, one for connecting to the switch in the same cell, and the other
for direct connection between the server in a cell and the corresponding server in another cell,
which complies with DCell network routing topology. The system architecture is detailed as
follows: (i) DCell0[0] consists of switch S0, two hosts H00 and H01, a number of VMs (n00 of
VM00 and n01 of VM01) on the hosts H00 and H01, respectively; (ii) the description of other
cells goes in the same manner.
4.2. Proposed SRN model
The SRN system model of the DCell-based DCN is presented in Figure 6. To simplify the
modeling and to focus on sophisticated interactions between VMs and servers in a cell and in
different cells of the network, we use two-state SRN models (consisting of UP and DOWN
states) for physical parts of the system, including hosts and switches, as shown in Figure 6(a)–(j).
Initially, there is a token in the UP state for each model of a certain physical part, which is
Figure 5. An architecture of a DCell-based data center network.
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depicted by a black dot which represents the initial normal working state of the physical hosts
and switches. Contrary to the presented case-study of VSS in Section 3, we do not take into
account the modeling of the VMM subsystem. Instead, we combine host and VMM in a unique
model by considering the mean time to failure equivalent (MTTFeq) and mean time to repair
equivalent (MTTReq) of the VMM subsystem as input parameters in the two-state models of
hosts. Also, we simplify the modeling of the VM subsystem by using only two-state SRNmodels
as shown in Figure 6(g) (VM subsystem model). There is an initial number of VMs on each host
in a general case as represented by tokens in UP states. Specifically, there are n00 of VMs in
PVM00up, and n01 of VMs in PVM01up in cell DCell0[0]. In DCell0[1], the numbers of VMs initially
running in a normal state on each host are n10 of VM10, and n11 of VM11, which are hosted on
H10 and H11, respectively. Those numbers in DCell0[2] are n20 of VM20 and n21 of VM21. Unlike
the SRN model of a single unit of VSS in Figure 3, we capture in the SRN system model the VM
live migration techniques within a cell and between different cells for the sake of fault tolerance
and improvement of system availability.
Figure 6. SRN system model of a DCell-based data center network.
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The VM migration is implemented between two hosts in a cell when a host in the cell experi-
ences downtime due to a certain failure. In cell DCell0[0] for instance, the VM live migration is
triggered to migrate all running VMs from the host H00 to the host H01 immediately when the
host H00 fails (represented by a token in PH00dn). The immediate transition tH00f is triggered to
remove all tokens in PVM00up and deposit them in PVM01mig. As the timed transition TVM01mig is
fired, the tokens in PVM01mig are removed and deposited in PVM01up, representing the comple-
tion of VM live migration processes from H00 to H01. If host H01 fails (i.e., a token is placed in
PH01dn), the VM live migration is performed fromH01 toH00 and is captured by the immediate
transition tH01f (to trigger VM live migration processes), the place PVM00mig (the state of a VM in
migration), and the timed transition TVM00mig (to represent the migration processes that take
time to complete). The description of VM live migration within a cell occurs in the same
manner for other cells DCell0[1] and DCell0[2].
In the case of a failed switch in a cell, VM live migration is performed between two hosts in
two different cells via a peer-to-peer connection. For instance, if switch S0 fails, the connections
between the two hosts H00 and H01 in cell DCell0[0] and the two host connections to outside
users are disrupted. However, the number of VM00 and VM01 are still running on hosts H00
andH01, respectively. It is necessary to migrate these VMs to other cells in order to enhance the
overall availability of the system. The VM migration processes from cell DCell0[0] to the other
two cells are triggered by the two immediate transitions tVM01m (to migrate VMs from DCell0[0]
to DCell0[1]) and tVM02m (to migrate VMs from DCell0[0] to DCell0[2]). After that, the tokens in
PVM00up are removed and deposited in PVM01m and are then deposited in PVM10up in cell
DCell0[1] as TVM01m is fired. The transition of tokens PVM00up in DCell0[0] to PVM10up in cell
DCell0[1] captures the migration of VM on host H00 after a failure of switch S0 between the
two different cells. On the other side, the tokens in PVM01up are removed and deposited in
PVM02m and are then deposited in PVM20up in cell DCell0[2]. This represents the migrations of
VMs on host H01 after the failure of switch S0 from cell DCell0[0] to cell DCell0[2].
Without loss of generality, the VM live migration techniques within a cell and between two
cells are described in detail as above for cell DCell0[0]. These migrations apply similarly to the
other cells DCell0[1] and DCell0[2].
4.3. Availability evaluation
The proposed SRNmodels are all implemented in SPNP. The default input parameters are listed
inTable 3. To reduce the complexity of model analysis, we initiate only one VMon each hostH00
Input Description Values Input Description Values
λH Host failure rate 800 hours μH Host repair rate 9.8 hours
λVM VM failure rate 4 months μVM VM repair rate 30 min
λS Switch failure rate 1 year μS Switch repair rate 24 hours
ωmig Network bandwidth within a DCell0 1 GB/s ωm Network bandwidth between two DCell0s 256 Mb/s
SVM VM image size 10 GB n00, n01 No. Of initial VMs in Dcell0[0] 1
Table 3. Default input parameters for SRN system model of a DCN.
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and H01 in cell DCell0[0] in the default case, and there are no other VMs in the other cells.
However, we also evaluate the impact of the number of VMs in the DCN on the overall system
availability. In this case-study, we consider two different evaluation scenarios: (I) a standalone
DCell0 (with two hosts and one switch), and (II) the proposed three-cell DCN (as modeled
above). The reward rates used to compute SSA of the two cases are defined as follows:
AI ¼
1 : if #PVM00up þ #PVM01up > 0
 
&& #PS0up ¼¼ 1
 
0 : otherwise
8<
:
AII ¼
1 : if #PVM00up þ #PVM01up > 0
 
&& #PS0up ¼¼ 1
  
k #PVM10up þ #PVM11up > 0
 
&& #PS1up ¼¼ 1
  
k #PVM20up þ #PVM21up > 0
 
&& #PS2up ¼¼ 1
  
0 : otherwise
8>>>>><
>>>>>>:
(12)
• Steady-state availability:
• We first evaluate SSA and downtime of the two scenarios as shown in Table 4. We
assume that a minute of system downtime incurs a penalty of 16,000 USD for the
system owner according to the SLA signed with customers [29]. The results clearly
show that the proposed three-cell DCN obtains much higher availability, and thus
reduce downtime minutes and downtime cost penalty in a year than a standalone cell
with only two physical servers.
• We also evaluate the impact of the initial number of VMs in a DCN on the system’s
overall availability, as shown in Table 5. The results show that as we increase the
initial number of VMs, the overall system availability also increases. The increased
SSA in the proposed three-cell DCN is also faster than in the standalone DCell0.
However, if the initial number of VMs (represented by the total number of tokens in
the proposed SRN system model) obtains a large value, it causes a memory error in
computing the system availability due to the largeness problem of the SRN model.
• Sensitivity analysis of SSA: We observe the variation of SSA in accordance with changes in
the selected input parameters, including MTTF and MTTR of hosts, VMs and switches,
and VM migration rate between two hosts in a cell or in two different cells, as shown in
Figure 7. The results show that:
Case Description SSA No. of nines Downtime (min/year) Downtime cost (USD/year)
I Standalone DCell0 0.997240422469 2.55 1450.4 23,206,943
II Proposed three-cell DCN 0.999950276761 4.30 26.1 418,152
Table 4. Steady-state availability and downtime cost.
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• SSA is improved as we increase MTTFs and VM migration rates, and as we decrease
MTTRs.
• In Figure 7(a), we see that the switch is an important component of the network
because its MTTF is small. Thus, the SSA clearly drops down vertically in comparison
to the MTTFs of other components. Furthermore, MTTF of a host is a significant
parameter in the long-run since it causes a better enhancement in the overall avail-
ability than the other MTTFs.
• In Figure 7(b), we clearly find that the repair time of a switch does not affect the SSA
because we perform VM migration between cells to tolerate the failures of switches.
This ensures that VMs can be migrated to other cells, regardless of the failure/recov-
ery of a certain switch. However, we can see that the recovery of a VM has a greater
impact on SSA than that of a host.
• In Figure 7(c), the migration rates of VMs between cells can clearly enhance SSA in
comparison with those within a cell. However, the low value of the VM migration
rate within a cell severely drops the system’s availability.
nVM I II
SSA #nines SSA #nines
1 0.997064755072 2.532356 0.999773875854 3.646
2 0.997240422469 2.559157 0.999950276761 4.303
3 0.997240488479 2.559168 0.999950574780 4.306
4 0.997240519634 2.559173 0.999950839446 4.308
5 0.997240550678 2.559178 0.999951101800 4.311
6 0.997240759564 2.559210 m.e m.e
(m.e: memory error)
Table 5. Impact of number of VMs.
Figure 7. Sensitivity analysis with respect to impacting parameters. (a) MTTF, (b) MTTR, (c) VM migration rate.
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5. Case study III: a Disaster Tolerant Data Center (DTDC)
5.1. A typical system architecture of a DTDC
This case-study considers disaster tolerance of cloud computing in a DCS. The system is com-
posed of two different DCs (DC1 and DC2), which are geographically located in two distant
regions, as shown in Figure 8. In each DC, we place a VSS of two physical servers (H1 and H2 in
DC1, and H3 and H4 in DC2). All physical machines are assumed to be identical. Each server is
initially capable of running a VM (VM1~VM4 runs on H1~H4, respectively). Shared network
attached storage (NAS) is equipped in each DC to provide distributed storage and a VMmigra-
tion mechanism between two hosts in the same DC. To implement disaster tolerance and recov-
ery strategies between DCs, a back-up server is incorporated to provide VM data backup. The
back-up server allows periodic synchronization of VM data between DCs. This allows the most-
updated VM data to be recovered onto an operational DC after a disaster strikes on another DC.
Furthermore, to enhance the system’s overall availability, we use the (active-standby) fail-over
technique and VM switching mechanism. Specifically, when a VM on a certain host fails, a
standby VM on the same host wakes up and takes over the operations of the failed VM. If there
is no standby VM on the same host, the standby VM on the remaining host goes up and takes
place on the failed host.
If a host in a DC fails, its VMs in the standby state are switched on in order to load onto the
remaining host. Various VM migration mechanisms are also taken into account in this system.
VM live-migration is performed between two hosts in a DC when one of the hosts fails. VM
migration between two DCs is triggered when a DC undergoes a system failure when two
hosts enter a downtime period simultaneously. When a disaster devastates a DC, VM migra-
tion between the back-up server (in a safe zone) and the remaining operational DC is
implemented as a means of disaster recovery.
5.2. Availability modeling of a DTDC
The SRN system model for availability quantification of the studied DTDC is shown in Figure 9.
We use simplified two-state SRNmodels (UP andDOWN) to capture general failure and recovery
behaviors of physical parts in the system, including the physical hosts H1–H4 (Figure 9(a), (b), (j),
Figure 8. A conceptual architecture of a disaster tolerant data center system.
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and (i), respectively), NAS1 in DC1, and NAS2 in DC2 (Figure 9(c) and (h), respectively). We use
immediate transitions tHupo, tHdowno, tNASupo, and tNASdowno to remove tokens in the up and down
places of the host andNASmodels in order to represent the entire operational termination of aDC
when a disaster strikes. When the disaster passes and the reconstructed DC starts a new opera-
tional cycle, the immediate transitions tHupin and tNASupin are used to deposit new tokens in the up
states of the host and NAS models. The occurrence of a disaster at a site is also represented by
using a two-state model as shown in Figure 9(d) and (g) for the occurrence of a disaster at DC1
and DC2, respectively. The two-state SRN model in Figure 9(f) captures the operational and
failure states of the back-up server.
The modeling of VM subsystems in DC1 and DC2 are shown in Figure 9(e) and (k), respec-
tively. Since we initially assume that all hosts and VMs are identical, the modeling of the two
DCs is also identical. The model initializes N tokens in PVM1up, and the other N tokens in
PVM2std represent N operational VMs with their N standby VMs at the beginning. Each VM
sub-model mainly has four states, including the operational state (PVMup), failure state (PVMfail),
standby state (PVMstd), and synchronization state (PVMsync). If a VM fails, it moves from the
upstate PVMup to the failure state PVMfail. When the failed VM is repaired, it moves to the
standby state PVMstd. At this point, the active-standby fail-over mechanism of VMs is captured
as follows. When a VM fails, a standby VM (represented by a token in PVMstd) on the same host
(before the disaster) or on the remaining host (after the disaster) transits to PVMsync in order to
synchronize the most-updated data on the NAS of that DC corresponding to the previously
failed VM. It then goes up to PVMup and takes the place of the failed VM. Dependence marks
are placed near timed transitions TVMfail and TVMrepair to represent the competition between
Figure 9. SRN system model of a disaster tolerant data center.
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failure and repair of VMs on the same host. The VM live-migration technique is triggered as a
host fails, which is captured by an immediate transition tVMm, a place PVMSm, and a timed
transition TVMmigrate. For instance, when host H1 fails, the VM live-migration is triggered to
migrate running VMs from the failed H1 to the running H2. Thus, tVMm12 is triggered to fire. A
number of tokens in PVM1up are removed and deposited at PVMS1m12 as it waits for migration.
The timed transition TVM2migrate is then fired to depict the migration process of VMs onto host
H2. The tokens in PVMS1m12 are removed and deposited in PVM2up. The reversed migration from
host H2 to H1 is captured by tVMm21, PVMS1m12, and TVM1migrate in the same manner. The places
PVMS1m and PVMS2m represent the storage of VMs on NAS1 and NAS2. When the two hosts in a
DC enter downtime, all tokens in the VM sub-models of VM1 and VM2 are removed by
immediate transitions tVMupo, tVMfailo, tVMstdo, and tVMsynco (attached to four main states of VM
sub-models) and deposited in PVMS1m via tVMS1min. However, if a disaster strikes, the all tokens
are removed from the places in the VM sub-models via the out-going immediate transitions
tVMupo, tVMfailo, tVMstdo, tVMsynco, tVMSmo, and tVMSmo. As the failed data center is reconstructed, a
pre-defined number of VMs are created on the NAS, which is captured by depositing tokens in
PVMSm via tVMSmin. The VMs are then assigned to hosts via the time transition TVMSmin.
The VM migration techniques between the two DCs, and between the backup server and the
two DCs, are modeled in Figure 9(l). The place PVMB represents the storage of VMs in the back-
up server. When a DC is destroyed due to a disaster, its VMs are stored in the back-up server
and represented by creating new tokens in PVMB via the timed transition TVMBin. When there is
a remaining DC in its operational state, the tokens in PVMB are transmitted to the
corresponding PVMSmig via the timed transition TVMSpre. The tokens are then deposited in
PVMSm via the timed transition TVMSm of the respective DC model with an imperfect coverage
factor CBmig. If this process fails with coverage factor (1-CBmig), the tokens are moved to PVMS2mf
via TVMSmf and returned to PVMB via TVMSmfrec. This transition of tokens captures the VM
migration from the back-up server to the operational DC. In the case when the back-up server
fails, the immediate transitions tVMBo, tVMSmigo, and tVMSmfo remove all tokens in PVMB, PVMSmig,
and PVMSmf to represent the loss of VM image files on the back-up server. The VMs will be
created on the back-up server as soon as it is recovered. The VMmigration between two DCs is
triggered when two hosts in a DC enter downtime simultaneously. In this case, we propose the
two hosts H1 and H2 in DC1 also stay in a downtime period simultaneously. A number of
VMs on DC1 are still stored in NAS1, represented by tokens in PVMS1m. Thus, it is necessary to
migrate these VMs onto the running DC2. The tokens are then transmitted to PVMS12mig after a
pre-migration process (TVMS12pre). The VM migration process is finalized with an imperfect
coverage factor Cmig as the transition TVMS12mig is fired. If this migration process fails with
coverage factor (1-Cmig), the tokens are moved to PVMS12migfo and returned to NAS1 in the
original DC1 via TVMS12migrec. The VM migration from DC2 to DC1 is performed similarly and
captured by the places PVMS21mig, PVMS21migf, the timed transition TVMS21pre, TVMS21mig (with
imperfect coverage factor Cmig), TVMS21migf (with coverage factor 1-Cmig), and TVMS21migrec.
5.3. Availability evaluation
The SRN system model is implemented in SPNP. Default input parameter values are shown in
Table 6. We assume that the number of VMs on a host is only one in order to reduce
complexity in model computation and analysis.
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• Steady state availability: We evaluate the availability of the DTDC in seven operational
scenarios by varying imperfect VMmigration coverage factors between the backup server
and the DCs and disaster occurrence frequency as follows: (I) The system of two
standalone DCs without DTconfronts disasters at the mean time to occurrence of 100 years
(default value); (II) The system with default parameters; (III-V) The network connection
has a high probability of failure (i.e., low probability of success in VM migration pro-
cesses) and the system is planted in an area with mean disaster time set alternatively to
100, 200, and 300 years; (VI-VIII) In contrast to cases (III)-(V), the migration between
distant parts may succeed with high probability and the DCs location experiences disas-
ters with mean time to occurrence also set to 100, 200, and 300 years. The results of SSA
and downtime evaluation are shown in Table 7 such that following criteria are satisfied:
Input Description Assigned transitions Values
λHf Host failure rate TH1f, TH2f, TH3f, TH4f 800 hours
μHr Host recovery rate TH1r, TH2r, TH3r, TH4r 9.8 hours
λNASf NAS failure rate TNAS1f, TNAS2f 45 years
μNASr NAS recovery rate TNAS1r, TNAS2r 4 hours
λDCoccur Time to disaster occurrence at a DC TDC1occur, TDC2occur 100 years
μDCr DC recovery rate after a disaster TDC1r, TDC2r 1 year
λBf Backup DC failure rate TBf 50,000 hours
μBr Backup DC recovery rate TBr 30 min
λVMfail VM failure rate TVM1fail, TVM2fail, TVM3fail, TVM4fail 4 months
μVMrepair VM repair rate TVM1repair, TVM2repair, TVM3repair,
TVM4repair
30 min
δVMsync VM synchronization rate TVM1sync, TVM2sync, TVM3sync, TVM4sync 5 min
ωVMmigrate VM migration rate between hosts TVM1migrate, TVM2migrate, TVM3migrate,
TVM4migrate
5s
γVMSmin VM loading rate into a host TVMS1min1, TVMS1min2, TVMS2min3,
TVMS2min4
1 s
ηVMSpre VM pre-migration rate between DCs and backup server TVMS12pre, TVMS21pre, TVMS1pre,
TVMS2pre
5 min
θVMSmigrec VM return rate to NAS after a migration failure TVMS12migrec, TVMS21migrec 1 min
θVMSmfsync VM synchronization rate with backup DC after a
migration failure
TVMS1mfsync, TVMS2mfsync 1 min
CBmig Imperfect factor of VM migration from backup DC 0.95
Cmig Imperfect factor of VM migration between DCs 0.85
N Number of VMs in a host 1
SVM Size of VM image and related data 4GB
ωNET Network speed 20 MB/s
Table 6. Default input parameters.
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• The safer DCs locations (longer frequency of disaster occurrence) results in a higher
system SSA.
• DCs should be placed in isolated areas to avoid any severe damage from disastrous
events, even though the network connection between distant parts of the system
might deal with more failure during VM migration processes.
• Higher SSA values are obtained with more reliable network connections, i.e. for
network connections that can guarantee a higher success rate for transmission
between distant parts of the system.
• Sensitivity analysis: As shown in Figure 10, we analyzed the sensitivity of the system’s SSA
with respect to different parameters, including imperfect coverage factors of VM migra-
tion (CBmig and Cmig), time to disaster occurrences (λDCoccur), VM image size (SVM), and
network bandwidth (ωNET). The impact of SVM and ωNET is shown in Figure 10(f). The
Case CBmig Cmig λDCoccur SSA No. of nines Downtime (min/year) Downtime cost (USD/year)
I x X 100 years 0.989455392105 1.98 5542.2 8,675,934.6
II 0.95 0.85 100 years 0.999843164703 3.80 82.4 1,318,922.1
III 0.1 0.1 100 years 0.998942162067 2.98 556.0 8,895,993.9
IV 0.1 0.1 200 years 0.999635096345 3.44 191.8 3,068,693.8
V 0.1 0.1 300 years 0.999795681447 3.69 107.4 1,718,237.3
VI 0.9 0.9 100 years 0.999841085616 3.80 83.5 1,336,406.4
VII 0.9 0.9 200 years 0.999946639371 4.27 28.0 448,741.5
VIII 0.9 0.9 300 years 0.999968676113 4.50 16.5 263,421.4
Table 7. SSA and downtime analyses.
Figure 10. Sensitivity analysis of a DTDC steady state availability: (a) CBmig, (b) Cmig, (c) λDCoccur, (d) SVM, (e) ωNET, (f)
ωNET, SVM.
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results show that: (i) the disaster tolerance solution with a back-up center would improve
SSA, even when connections between the back-up center with DCs incur imperfections in
VM migration processes; (ii) imperfections in the VM migration processes between DCs
slightly impact SSA when it increases; (iii) the system’s SSA is improved vastly if DCs are
located in safe areas with lower disaster occurrence frequency; (iv) larger VMs can reduce
the overall availability of the system; (v) a faster network connection between distant
locations can actually boost the system’s availability, especially for network speeds rang-
ing in 0-20 Mb/s, if the speed increases much higher, the effect is not much different from
the default parameters; (vi) the variation of both (ωNET, SVM) confirms the fact that higher
network speed and smaller VM sizes result in apparently higher SSA, whereas slower
network and larger VMs severely reduce the system’s availability.
6. Conclusion(s)
This chapter presented a set of availability models based on stochastic reward net for compre-
hensive system availability evaluation in data center systems. The data center systems scale
during evaluation was increased from a system of two virtualized servers (considered as a unit
block in data centers) in Section 3, to a typical network of virtualized servers complying with a
DCell topology in Section 4. Finally, the evaluated data centers are scaled up to a two-site data
center for disaster tolerance with a back-up center. A variety of fault and disaster tolerant
techniques were incorporated in the systems in order to achieve high availability. The systems
were evaluated under various case studies with regards to different metrics of interest, includ-
ing steady state availability and its sensitivity with respect to a number of impac factors. The
analysis results show comprehensive system behaviors and improved availability in accor-
dance with incorporated techniques in the data center systems.
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